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Based on the Ramsey equation and an ethically motivated rejection of pure utility time 
discount, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change concentrates on the use of 
the elasticity of marginal utility η in the intergenerational social welfare function. We support 
this position by showing that, also from the view point of sustainability, application of η is 
preferable to the use of the pure time discount parameter ρ when a balanced distribution of 
utility across generations is to be brought about. After reviewing empirical studies on the size 
of η we develop a novel axiomatic approach based on non–envy criteria by which we obtain 
values for η lying in a range between 1 and 2. Whereas the starting point of the Stern Review 
quite explicitly is an ethical one, many critics of the Review deny this ethical stance and thus 
– as described in our paper – miss a crucial element of the Stern Review. 
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The evaluation of consumption– and utility–streams over time by means of discounted
utilitarian objective functions has been a main topic of economic research for a long time.
The most important questions that economists have sought and still search to answer
are: How should the social discount rate used in intertemporal cost–beneﬁt–analysis be
related to market interest rates? How should uncertainty be taken into account when
determining the social discount rate? Is discounting of costs and beneﬁts justiﬁed at all
when future generations are involved, since it may be considered as unfair to them? The
recent publication of the Stern Review on the economics of climate change (Stern (2006))
has further stimulated this ongoing debate on discounting which even got some broader
publicity that way (The Economist (2006), Varian (2006)).
In the Stern Report, as in many other recent contributions, the discount rate r is
determined through the Ramsey equation that originally stems from the theory of economic
growth (Ramsey (1928)). As a necessary (and very general) condition for optimality of
growth paths it links the consumption discount rate r(t) at some point of time t to the
utility discount rate ρ (which is mostly assumed to be time invariant), to the elasticity
of the marginal rate utility of consumption (for a given isoelastic utility function) and
the consumption growth rate g(t) =
˙ c(t)
c(t). Omitting the time variable t, the Ramsey rule
precisely states that along an optimal growth path
r = gη + ρ (1)
has to hold for all points of time within the planning horizon.
Putting equation (1) into the focus of the treatment of discounting is very helpful to
clarify two issues that often have remained rather obscure in the discussion of intertemporal
evaluation. So, ﬁrst of all, this equation indicates that a clear distinction must be made
between the utility discount rate ρ and the consumption discount rate r. Whereas the
utility discount rate ρ is exogenously given as a parameter of pure time preference, the
consumption discount rate r is determined endogenously along the path that – for given
ρ > 0 – maximizes the present value of aggregate discounted utility. But the Ramsey
equation also presents a still more fundamental insight on discounting in a compact way:
Having in mind that the purpose of discounting is to ﬁnd a balance between welfare in
the present and in the future, the Ramsey equation shows that, to this end, a positive
pure utility time discount rate ρ can, to some extent, be substituted by a suﬃciently high
elasticity of marginal utility η. This idea has a very long tradition in the theory of interest,
dating back already to B¨ ohm–Bawerk’s (1891) ﬁrst reason for a positive interest rate and
was taken up, later on, e.g. by Dasgupta & Heal (1979), Olson & Bailey (1981), Sinn
(1987), Dasgupta (2001) and Asheim & Buchholz (2003).
In the extreme, the Ramsey equation would be fulﬁlled by setting ¯ η = r
g even if the
utility discount rate is zero, i.e. ρ = 0. Having no pure time discount of utility seems
particularly appealing when evaluation over time extends to future generations. Otherwise,
with ρ > 0, the underlying intertemporal preferences would not be intergenerationally
neutral which seems to be ethically questionable.1 From this viewpoint, avoiding pure
time discount and relying instead on the parameter η when deciding on intergenerational
distribution is preferable, because in this way systematic discrimination against people that
1Unequal treatment of generations has been objected also by many economists. See, e.g. Ramsey
(1928), Pigou (1932), and Harrod (1948), all quoted in the Stern Review.
2are ”unlucky” to appear later on the time axis will not occur. The Stern Review essentially
shares this ethically based point of view by applying a positive ρ only to capture the small
risk that the human species might be extinct (by a meteorite or so).2 Concerning the
normative foundation of intertemporal evaluation, the Report and its critics consequently
concentrate on the choice of η which, with this rigour, has not been quite common in
intertemporal welfare economics until recently. In this paper, we follow this approach,
reﬂecting further the use of η as a determinant of intertemporal allocation.
In our analysis, we will proceed as follows: In order to make the basic relationships
as transparent as possible, in Section 2 we explain the interchangeability of ρ and η in
a simple two–period–model. In particular, it can be shown in this way, that invoking
”sustainability” as a commonly shared condition for intertemporal allocations gives an
additional justiﬁcation for making intertemporal decisions by η and not by ρ. In Section
3, we then compare diﬀerent empirical studies that try to determine reasonable values of
η and assess their relevance in the intergenerational and, generally, normative context. In
Section 4 we develop an axiomatic approach for specifying parametrical values of η, thus
employing the standard method in ethical social choice theory. In Section 5 we discuss
some of the critical comments raised against the Stern Review and its preferences of η
over ρ. Section 6 concludes.
2 Intertemporal choice in a two–period–setting
2.1 An argument in favor of pure time discount
Assume that in a world of full certainty3, there are two generations t = 1,2 of equal size,
and that their consumption is given by ct, respectively.4 By G(c1,c2) = g we denote
the transformation curve, where G(c1,c2) is a partially diﬀerentiable and quasi–convex
function, which we assume to be strictly increasing in both variables, thus leading to
a strictly decreasing and concave transformation curve. Generation t’s well–being (in
the classical utilitarian sense) is denoted by ut = u(ct). The equality consciousness of
a hypothetical social planner (the ”ethical observer”) is described by a transformation
function h(ut) with h′(ut) > 0 and h′′(ut) < 0. Deﬁning δ = 1
1+ρ as the discount factor
when ρ ≥ 0 is the pure rate of time preference, the intertemporal social welfare function
becomes
W(c1,c2) = h(u(c1)) + δh(u(c2)) (2)
The social planner then solves the following optimization problem:
W(c1,c2) → max
c1,c2
s.t. G(c1,c2) = g (3)
Omitting variables, the ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution of this maximization
problem is given by
π   µ = δ   γ. (4)
2For a review of the philosophical (non–)legitimization of pure time discount see, e.g., Broome (1994)
and Broome (2004).
3Concentrating on the basic ethical issues of intertemporal choice in this paper we do not discuss all
the important problems that are related to risk and uncertainty. In particular, we will not deal with the
diﬀerent interpretation of η as a parameter of relative risk aversion as done in the Stern Review.















is the marginal rate of transformation between consumption of generation 1 and generation
2 at some (c1,c2).
With the help of condition (4) a standard argument in favor of pure time discounting,
i.e. ρ > 0 and thus δ < 1, can now be easily explained by an extreme example: Assume
that the economy is productive such that making a sacriﬁce of one unit of consumption
in period 1 will increase consumption by more than one unit in period 2. In this case,
γ(c1,c2) > 1 holds for all (c1,c2) on the transformation curve and γ(c1,c2) − 1 gives the
(marginal) internal rate of return which is the ”remuneration” for waiting. Furthermore,
suppose that the agents’ utility function u(ct) shows constant marginal utility (which
implies µ = 1), that the central planner exhibits no inequality aversion (which means
h(ut) = ut and thus π = 1) and furthermore wants to treat both generations equally (i.e.
δ = 1). Then clearly, condition (4) cannot be fulﬁlled as in this case for all points along
the transformation curve we have
π   µ = 1   1 < 1   γ = δ   γ (8)
Then the welfare maximum is a corner solution in which generation 1 has zero consumption
or, equivalently, the savings rate is 100%. This situation is depicted in Figure 1 where
the optimal allocation M1 lies on the vertical axis. In a productive economy unfettered
utilitarianism with equal treatment of both generations, i.e. application of the welfare
function W(c1,c2) = c1 + c2, thus implies a strong bias against the earlier generation
and renders the socially optimal allocation extremely unequal.5 Because the economy is
productive, aggregate consumption only becomes maximal when the whole consumption
is postponed to period 2 and generation 1 is forced into a state of poverty.6
The earlier generation 1 can be protected against such an excessive sacriﬁce by intro-
ducing suﬃciently high positive rates of time preference ρ > 0. As soon as δ < 1
γ(0,¯ c2)
the earlier generation will enjoy a strictly positive consumption level in the optimum Mδ.
Consumption of generation 1 becomes higher and that of generation 2 becomes lower if ρ in-
creases and, consequently, δ decreases. Achieving a more equal intertemporal distribution
5The excessive sacriﬁce argument can also be related to B¨ ohm-Bawerk’s (1891) third reason for a
positive interest rate (see already Buchholz (2003)): ”For if every employment of goods for future periods
is, not only technically, but also economically, more remunerative than the employment of them for the
present and near future, of course men would withdraw their stocks of goods, to a great extent from the
service of the present, and direct them to the more remunerative service of the future. But this would
cause an ebb-tide in the provision of the present, and a ﬂood in the provision of the future” (B¨ ohm-Bawerk
(1891), pp. 269-270). For a nice presentation of the same idea also see Broome (2006). B¨ ohm-Bawerk’s
ﬁrst reason is, roughly speaking, captured by η and his second reason by ρ.
6In an inﬁnite generation setting the ”jam tomorrow” paradox would arise, i.e. there would be an incen-
tive for the social planner to delay consumption forever, which technically means that welfare maximization









Figure 1: Expropriation of the earlier generation in a productive economy without utility
discounting and inequality aversion.
of consumption in this way is a classical justiﬁcation for discounting in the intertemporal
social welfare function.7
2.2 The interchangeability between ρ and η
The same safeguard for the earlier generation, however, can be provided by having de-
creasing marginal utility of consumption u′′(ct) < 0 at the agent’s level and/or by having
inequality aversion h′′(ut) < 0 at the level of the social planner. Being interested in so-
cial evaluation we concentrate our attention on the second possibility. For the sake of
simplicity we thus suppose u(ct) = ct and, furthermore, that the transformation function






1−η for η > 0, η  = 1
lnct for η = 1
(9)
where η, as the elasticity of the central planner’s marginal valuation of individual util-
ity/consumption, indicates the planner’s degree of inequality aversion (as in Atkinson’s



















= δγ (˜ c1,˜ c2) (11)
7This argument in favor of pure time preference has been put forward by philosophers (e.g. Rawls
(1971)) and economists (e.g. Arrow (1999)). See Marini & Scaramozzino (2000) for a theoretical analysis
on that and Hepburn (2006a) for an extensive discussion of the excessive sacriﬁce argument.
5which gives a simple analogue of the Ramsey equation in the two–period–model.8
Based on (11) we now want to work out explicitly how a certain allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2) may
be implemented by diﬀerent combinations of δ and η. This consideration, in particular,
shows how a given pure time preference δ may be replaced by an appropriately chosen
inequality aversion η without giving rise to a diﬀerent welfare maximum. To describe this
substitutability between δ and η more closely, we take the logarithm of (11) and solve the
equation thus obtained for η. For a given (˜ c1,˜ c2) on the transformation curve and letting
δ∗(˜ c1,˜ c2) := 1
γ(˜ c1,˜ c2) this yields
η(δ) =
lnδ − lnδ∗(˜ c1,˜ c2)
ln˜ c2 − ln˜ c1
(12)
To interpret (12), we distinguish three cases.






δ ≥ δ∗(˜ c1,˜ c2) is required for implementation of (˜ c1,˜ c2). In this range, a higher δ can be
replaced by a higher η. (See Figure 2.)






δ ≤ δ∗(˜ c1,˜ c2) is required for implementation. In this range, a higher δ can be substituted
for by a lower η. (See Figure 3.)

















Figure 3: Case 2: ˜ c2 < ˜ c1
In Figures 2 and 3 the solid lines describe the combinations of δ and η that all imple-
ment the given allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2). For the both extreme cases with either η = 0 or δ = 1
comparison of the two ﬁgures in particular yields the following observation:
On the one hand, every consumption proﬁle (˜ c1,˜ c2) on the transformation curve be-
comes a welfare maximum by letting δ = δ∗(˜ c1,˜ c2) < 1 and η = 0, i.e. by having a
time discount, but no inequality aversion. On the other hand, δ = 1, i.e. no pure time
8It is, however, a rather complicated exercise to derive the Ramsey equation from (11). See Dasgupta
(2001), p. 18, and Creedy (2006) on this.
6preference, is only compatible with the selection of some (˜ c1,˜ c2), if ˜ c2 > ˜ c1, i.e. in case
1. Then taking η(1) as depicted in Figure 2 will do the job. In this way every (˜ c1,˜ c2) on
the transformation curve with ˜ c2 > ˜ c1 can be implemented with parameters δ = 0 and
η = η(1).
Therefore, with regard to possible choices of δ and η, there is an asymmetry between
case 1 and case 2: Making choices by δ instead of η gives more ﬂexibility which, however,
does not seem to be an advantage, if another normative postulate comes into play. So
it is widely accepted that economic development over time should be sustainable, which,
according to the usual deﬁnition, is to mean that utility and consumption should not de-
teriorate over time.9 Following this idea, we call a consumption proﬁle (˜ c1,˜ c2) sustainable,
if ˜ c2 ≥ ˜ c1, i.e. it lies on the segment BC in Figure 4. Then our considerations lead to the
following result:
Proposition 1 In a productive economy a consumption path (˜ c1,˜ c2) is sustainable with
˜ c2 > ˜ c1, if and only if it can be implemented by a social welfare function W(c1,c2) with
δ = 1 and η > 0.
Given some positive degree of inequality aversion η, suﬃciently small discount factors δ,
however, would produce non–sustainable paths in segment AB in Figure 4. A sustainable
path (˜ c1,˜ c2) can only be implemented if δ > δ∗(˜ c1,˜ c2).
If one adopts sustainability as an ethical objective, these considerations have the fol-
lowing important implications:10
• If the social planner treats generations equally, i.e. δ = 1, and is inequality averse,
a path that maximizes intertemporal social welfare is always sustainable. Allowing
for positive time discount δ < 1, this is obviously not the case, such that varying
only η protects future generations in any case.
• Varying of η is ﬂexible enough to pick out every sustainable path (˜ c1,˜ c2) with ˜ c2 > ˜ c1
such that the social planner needs not falling back upon pure time discount to protect
the interests of the earlier generation.
Therefore, we conclude that not only from the viewpoint of time neutrality as an ethical
axiom, but also from the viewpoint of sustainability, it is clearly preferable (and completely
suﬃcient) to bring about the desired balance between interests of the two generations by
having inequality aversion and not by discounting utility.
This conﬁrms that, deﬁning intertemporal social preferences that reﬂect the concerns
of intertemporal fairness, the focus should be on the parameter η. This gives a further
support for the approach taken by the Stern Report. The next logical step then is to
inquire what levels of η appear to be reasonable. In the following section, we therefore
ﬁrst give a review on the empirical and experimental studies that have been carried out to
determine η, and to which the Stern Review casually refers11 to justify its speciﬁc choice
of η = 1.
9This is in line with the famous deﬁnition of sustainability given by the Brundtland Report (1987), p.
43, which says that economic development is to be called sustainable if it ”meets the needs of the present
without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” See also Asheim et al. (2001)
for a theoretical justiﬁcation of sustainability in this sense.
10For a generalization to multi and inﬁnite period setting see Asheim & Buchholz (2003). In this extended
framework, constancy of η can no longer be assumed.







3 Empirical studies on the size of η
There is considerable confusion about the ”correct” value of η that should be used in
such cost–beneﬁt analysis as undertaken by the Stern Review. So, in his comment on the
Stern Report, Weitzman (2007a) speaks of η = 2 as his ”own rough point–guesstimate of
what most economists might think are decent parameter values” (p. 707) for the Ramsey
equation. We think that the notion ”guesstimate” reﬂects well the uncertainty with respect
to η.
There are various, conceptually rather diﬀerent approaches to determine η by refer-
ence to empirical observations. At the individual level, leaky bucket experiments and
questionnaire studies, the idea of which can be traced back to Atkinson (1970), have
been conducted. So, earlier work by Glejser et al. (1977) showed that people exhibit risk
aversion, the degree of which is very sensitive to microeconomic factors. Concerning the
speciﬁc value of η the picture ﬂowing from these studies is not uniform. Amiel et al. (1999)
obtain fairly low values of η, essentially between 0 and 0.5. On the other hand, the median
of the relative risk aversion parameter η found by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) lies
between 2 and 3.
A caveat of measuring the concavity of agents’ utility functions is that actually two
concepts are mixed up. Concavity captures both risk aversion and inequality aversion,
and, although both concepts have similar implications for the society an agent desires to
live in, their underlying ethical content diﬀers considerably. Carlsson et al. (2005) use an
extension of the leaky bucket experiment in order to estimate individual risk aversion and
inequality aversion separately. They ﬁnd, that both are positively correlated, i.e. that
people who are risk averse are also inequality averse, and that the median value of the
parameter η seems to lie in an interval between 1 and 2.
In a recent study that partially also relies on the leaky bucket approach, Pirttilae &
Uusitalo (2007) use representative surveys, in which questions on the actual real–world
8economic situations were asked. One could argue that this type of questionnaire is likely
to reveal attitudes towards inequality in a more realistic way than laboratory experiments.
In a ﬁrst step, the inequality parameter η was found to be below 0.5, i.e. in the same
order of magnitude as in the experimental results by Amiel et al. (1999). In a second
step, questions were asked concerning the desirability of hypothetical wage distributions.
Here, the estimated η–values were considerably higher, i.e. greater than 3. The study of
Pirttilae & Uusitalo (2007) thus shows, that the η–estimations seem to be highly sensitive
to the type of question asked and to the environment in which the survey or experiment
is conducted.
Another type of research instead draws on observed market data to specify η. Some
studies use micro data of peoples’ lifetime consumption, and others exploit information
on the agents’ demand for preference–independent goods, such as food, to gain insight
into their individual η-values. All studies, carefully reviewed in Evans (2006), also ﬁnd
values of η in the range between 1 and 2, which is similar to the estimations from the
leaky bucket experiments and questionnaire approaches.
By a completely diﬀerent method that refers to political instead of individual choices,
it is explored what value for η governments implicitly use when evaluating the costs and
beneﬁts of public projects. In most of these studies, the η–values are derived by evaluating
income tax schedules, as their degree of progression should reﬂect the inequality aversion
of the government. Assuming that the tax schedule is based on the the principle of equal
absolute sacriﬁce and that agents have CES–utility functions over income, the inequality
aversion parameter η underlying the tax scheme can be estimated by using the equation






where y denotes income and T(y) is the income tax schedule (see Cowell & Gardiner
(1999) for an explanation of (13)). Using such an approach, Stern (1977) himself has,
in a pioneering study, estimated an η-value of about 2. For the UK, Cowell & Gardiner
(1999) have obtained values in the range between 1.3 and 1.4. Other estimates for OECD
countries (see Evans (2005) and EU member countries (see Evans & Sezer (2005)) lie in a
similar interval, with lowest values around 1.2 and highest values around 1.6.
This ”revealed social value” approach (see Cowell & Gardiner (1999), p. 24, for this
term), however, is not generally accepted. There are serious doubts because the results
obtained that way crucially depend on the supposed functional form for individual pref-
erences and on the type of the underlying sacriﬁce principle. So, assuming equal relative
instead of equal absolute sacriﬁce would yield completely diﬀerent results such that ”scep-
ticism” to the usefulness of these estimates seems to be warranted (Creedy (2006), p.
15).
But there is also a much deeper problem with these empirical studies. So, one has to
carefully distinguish between individuals’ attitude towards inequality, reﬂected by their
own preferences, on the one hand, and the degree of inequality aversion, reﬂected by
social welfare functions, on the other. The former measures how people actually behave
and how they feel about inequality, hence refers to the world as it is. The latter is a value
judgement, i.e. to what extent a social planner allows distributional concerns to aﬀect
policy decisions, and in that sense it reﬂects how the world ought to be. The Stern Report
in its general part (with reference to Arrow (1995)) underlines the distinction between a
”descriptive” and a ”prescriptive” approach (Stern (2006), p. 47). The important link
between the two concepts is that in democratic societies the government’s attitude will
9(or should) reﬂect voters’ preferences. Nevertheless, the empirical studies on η represent
just one possibility to specify η and the values obtained in this way are not normatively
compelling. Beyond these problems at the methodological level, the various studies do
not provide a unique value for η but at most delimit a rather wide range for η–levels. So
much space is left for the choice of η.
4 Ethical axioms for determining the size of η
4.1 Framework
We now aim to show not only empirical studies but also some simple ethical axiomatics my
be useful to delimit the interval of reasonable values for the inequality parameter η. Since
the underlying normative requirements reﬂect some minimum fairness concerns for the
distribution among generations, they should hold even in the most simple environment. As
above, we therefore consider the case with two generations t = 1,2 of equal size but we now
assume a constant marginal rate of transformation m > 1 between consumption c1 of the
ﬁrst generation and consumption c2 of the second generation. Hence, the transformation
curve is deﬁned by




with y being the exogenously given income.
Maximization of Wη,1(c1,c2) as given by (10) with respect to (14) yields the social






















































showing, how the consumption possibilities of both generations react to changes in the
productivity parameter m given η. In the following subsection, we will make use of these
results to derive the implications of some simple fairness postulates. This is the usual
procedure in ethical social choice theory. Put in another way, ”hypothetical thought
experiment[s]” (Stern (2007), pp. 4-5) are carried out asking which values of η will produce
the results that are desired according to some normative criteria. In this way, ethical
judgement becomes more transparent and substantiated.
4.2 Postulate A: Protecting the interests of earlier generations
In a productive economy, as explained in a previous section an adequate choice of η avoids










Figure 5: Consumption paths for diﬀerent η–values.
parameter m is given. We now want to extend this basic idea to the eﬀects that changes
of m have on both generations. As a normative postulate, this is to mean that the earlier
generation should not – under the pressure of the utilitarian maxim – have to suﬀer when
productivity increases. Most people would readily agree that the Pareto principle should
also hold in this situation. In a world of uncertainty, this would also imply insurance of
the earlier generation, if there is the risk of a productivity increase.
Postulate A: No generation should attain a lower consumption level in the welfare max-
imum when the productivity parameter m increases.
Which degree of inequality aversion is required to fulﬁll this postulate can directly be
read from equations (17) and (18). Clearly, c′
2(m) > 0 is always given. However, c′
1(m) > 0
holds if and only if 1 − 1
η > 0, i.e. η > 1. This directly leads to the following results.
Proposition 2 : The postulate A is fulﬁlled in our setting, if and only if η > 1.
A suﬃciently high inequality aversion thus proves to be necessary and suﬃcient to protect
the interests of generation 1 and to avoid its expropriation when there is technical progress,
i.e. m increases. In contrast, if we had η < 1, the ﬁrst generation’s consumption would
even go to zero with productivity m going to inﬁnity. For η > 1, as follows directly from
(16), c1(m) instead approximates total income y for m going to inﬁnity.
Figure 5 depicts two consumption paths C(m) = (c1(m),c2(m)) for the two situations,
i.e. for η < 1 and for η > 1. Note that for η = 1 consumption c1(m) in the ﬁrst
period is constant and equal to
y
2 irrespective of m, so that generation 1 neither gains
nor looses with changes in productivity.12 Therefore, we can conclude, that in our simple
12The value η = 1 would also be obtained by an ”as–if”–bargaining process between the two generations.
For this result, the cooperative bargaining games by Nash or Kalai–Smorodinski can be applied, by choosing
11two–period setting η = 1 is a lower bound for inequality aversion, if one wants to avoid the
counterintuitive eﬀect that productivity increases reduce earlier generations to poverty.13
In the inﬁnite period setting, η > 1 is even required for a more technical reason, because
combining δ = 1 and η ≤ 1 would imply diverging utility sums such that the the utilitarian
social welfare function would not be directly applicable. In the next two subsections,
we will show how – by applying additional equity criteria – even speciﬁc values for the
inequality aversion parameter η can be obtained.
4.3 Postulate B: Non–envy in the absolute sense
In the economic literature, there is a tradition of applying non–envy criteria (in the sense
of Foley (1967), Kolm (1972, 1998) and Varian (1974)) to identify allocations, that the
concerned individuals would consider as being equitable.14 The idea of this approach is
that some agent i is put in the shoes of some other agent j and vice versa, such that no
exogenous arbitrator is required. If then none of both agents would want to interchange
his position with the position of his counterpart, the underlying allocation is considered
as being fair by both agents.
The direct application of the non–envy principle to an intergenerational allocation
(˜ c1,˜ c2) leads to the following condition, that is based on the assumption that both gener-
ations compare their absolute levels of consumption.
Postulate B: Generation 1 considers the allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2) as absolute envy–free if
˜ c1 ≥ ˜ c2
m. Generation 2 considers the allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2) as absolute envy–free if ˜ c2 ≥ m˜ c1.
An allocation is then called fair in the absolute sense if it is considered as envy–free
in the absolute sense by both agents. Postulate B clearly implies that ˜ c2 = m   ˜ c1 has to
hold in every allocation that is fair in the absolute sense.
The motivation for Postulate B is as follows: Generation 1 comparing her consumption
level ˜ c1 with that of generation 2 according to Postulate B takes into account, that the
equivalent of ˜ c2 that would actually be attainable for her amounts to ˜ c2
m, given the loss
of consumption entailed by shifting consumption from period 2 to period 1. A similar
reasoning applies to generation 2. Moreover, in an allocation that is envy–free in the
absolute sense no generation makes use of a higher share of the exogenously given income
y, so that both generations have equal claims to the resource endowments. Demanding
equality of resource use gives a further motivation to Postulate B.
We will show now that all allocations (˜ c1,˜ c2) that – given some productivity parameter
m – are fair in the absolute sense and feasible, can be implemented by a social welfare
function that is based on an isoelastic transformation function with η = 1.
Proposition 3 Let (˜ c1,˜ c2) be an allocation that is feasible given some ˜ m and some
income level ˜ y. Then, (˜ c1,˜ c2) fulﬁlls Postulate B if and only if it maximizes W1,1(c1,c2) =
lnc1 + lnc2 given ˜ m and ˜ y.
(0,0) as the threat point.
13This conﬁrms Weitzman (2007a), p. 707, who states – without further explanation – that η = 1 is
”the lowest lower bound of just about any economist’s best–guess range.”
14Invoking a non–regret condition in the context of intertemporal valuation is a somewhat similar idea
and is suggested by Quiggin (2006), p. 11.
12Proof. A feasible allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2) maximizes W1,1(c1,c2) given ˜ m if and only if
∂W1,1/∂c1
∂W1,1/∂c2






= ˜ m (19)
The last part of this identity, however, is equivalent to Postulate B what proves the
assertion.
Varying ˜ m and ˜ y the set of allocations (˜ c1,˜ c2) that is covered by Proposition 3 is equal
to the set of allocations (˜ c1,˜ c2) which have ˜ c1 > 0 and ˜ c2 > 0, since, given strictly positive
consumption levels, (˜ c1,˜ c2) is fair in the absolute sense by letting ˜ m = ˜ c2
˜ c1 and thus clearly
feasible letting ˜ y := ˜ c1 + ˜ c2
˜ m = 2˜ c1. Therefore, seeking to implement fair allocations as
social welfare optima, Postulate B deﬁnitely implies the use of W1,1(c1,c2) (or a strictly
monotone transformation of it). So Postulate B, from the normative perspective of a non–
envy condition, provides a justiﬁcation for the use of η = 1 as assumed in the main part
of the Stern Report.
It is important to underline that to derive these results no speciﬁc assumptions on
the social welfare function Wη,δ(c1,c2), such as additive separability or iso–elasticity, are
required. Rather, they are an implication of the non–envy postulate alone.
4.4 Postulate C: Non–envy in the relative sense
In the following, we want to explore the implications of a diﬀerent interpretation of free-
dom of envy. So one may argue, that people do care less about absolute consumption,
but that they rather compare their relative position vis–` a–vis the other generation, i.e.
their status.15 The non–envy–test then refers to the ratios of consumption levels of both
generations whereas the adjustment to the economy’s productivity, i.e. to m, remains as
before. The following postulate speciﬁes this idea:







1 ≥ ˜ c2
2







1 ≤ ˜ c2
2
An allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2) is called status fair if it is considered as envy–free in the relative
sense by both agents. Postulate C clearly implies that
m˜ c2
1 = ˜ c2
2 (20)
has to hold in any status–fair allocation (˜ c1,˜ c2).
Proposition 4 Let (˜ c1,˜ c2) be an allocation that is feasible given some productivity pa-
rameter ˜ m and some income level ˜ y. Then, (˜ c1,˜ c2) fulﬁlls Postulate C if and only if it
maximizes the social welfare function W2,1(c1,c2) = −(c−1
1 + c−1
2 ) given ˜ m and ˜ y.
15For the impact of status concerns on agents economic decisions see e.g. Veblen (1899), Layard (1980),
Ng (1987), and more recently Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), Luttmer (2005), Fehr & Schmidt (2006).
13Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Proposition 3. A feasible allocation
maximizes W2,1(c1,c2) given ˜ m if and only if
∂W2,1/∂c1
∂W2,1/∂c2










= ˜ m (21)
The last part of this identity, however, is equivalent to Postulate C what proves the
assertion.
Postulate B thus gives a justiﬁcation for the use of η = 2 in evaluation over time which
lies in that range that is preferred by many critics of the Stern Report.
Combining Postulate B with Postulate C suggests that, from the non–envy perspective,
some mixture between the social preferences described by Proposition 3 and Proposition
4 might seem reasonable. Thus η would have to lie between 1 and 2.
5 The critique of the Stern Review’s approach to intergen-
erational valuation – a comment
The main message of the Stern Review, i.e. that strong immediate action to combat
climate change is necessary to protect mankind from serious harm, heavily rests upon the
Report’s speciﬁc approach to take future environmental damages into account. So it is no
surprise, that many of the objections that have been put forward against the report and
its conclusions are centered around basic issues of evaluation over time. Even though most
critics consider the value of η chosen by Stern as too low, the severity of the objections at
the conceptual level diﬀers very much. In the following, we concentrate our discussion on
the arguments raised by Dasgupta (2006, 2007) on the one hand and by Nordhaus (2006)
on the other, which are both typical for two strands of criticism.16
A rather modest objection is only concerned with the speciﬁc choice of the inequality
aversion parameter η, while, in principle, accepting the ethically based social welfare
function approach and the choice of a small value for the pure time preference parameter
ρ. So Dasgupta (2006, 2007) admits that that he personally ”does not know how to
justify ρ > 0 in a deterministic world”, so that ”we should instead experiment with η” (p.
16). But in contrast to Stern, Dasgupta (2007) prefers a value for η that exhibits more
inequality aversion and thus, in a productive economy, is more in favor of the present
generation. Looking at a simple growth model with a time–invariant constant returns to
scale technology, he shows that choosing η = 1 as in the main part of the Stern Report
would imply implausibly high savings rates. In order to give earlier generations more
protection and to obtain more equally distributed intertemporal consumption paths, some
higher value for η is required. Dasgupta (2007) suggests the use of a η somewhere in the
range between 2 and 4, but except some scant reference also to experimental studies and
to the higher plausibility of the entailed savings rates, he does not provide justiﬁcations.17
Rather, he concedes (p. 15-16) that we have ”very little understanding of what η implies
for intergenerational saving.” To support Stern’s and Dasgupta’s common position and
16Other critics are not so explicit concerning the direction of their objections or are mainly concerned
with speciﬁc issues, i.e. Weitzman (2007a, 2007b) focusses on problems of risk and uncertainty in evaluation
over time.
17Similar choices of η are, also based on considerations of plausibility, recommended e.g. by Gollier
(2006), Arrow (2007) and Weitzman (2007a).
14to enhance the understanding of η’s role in evaluation over time, has been the main
motivation for our analysis in the previous sections.
Another attack of prominent economists against the Stern Report (see above all Nord-
haus (2007) and Weitzman (2007a)) goes much deeper, as it casts doubt on the ethically
motivated use of social welfare functions as such. It is an implicit presumption of this
fundamental criticism that applying exogenously deﬁned normative criteria to assess the
intertemporal distribution of costs and beneﬁts does not conform to the paradigm of main-
stream economics, i.e. to ”methodological individualism.” According to this view, policy
recommendations must in general not be based on the subjective preferences of virtual
philosophers but on the actual preferences of real people. Especially concerning the rel-
ative valuation of future versus present consumption that are at stake in the context of
climate change, these individual preferences are revealed on the capital market by the in-
terest rate, which, therefore, should also guide political actions. Moreover, economic and
political decisions today are exclusively made by currently living people and thus can only
reﬂect their preferences (which, however, are not purely egoistic but also include altruistic
feelings towards their descendants and thus to future generations). Therefore, building
a policy–oriented analysis on normative judgements is not only hard to justify from the
economist’s point of view, but also of no practical relevance. So it is held that an ethical
”Nirvana approach” lies at the heart of the Stern Report (Sinn (2007)).
This basic criticism is obviously right insofar as the social welfare function used in the
Stern Review cannot be determined in an objective way – which is well admitted in the
Report itself. What people (including the authors of the Report) think to be desirable for
the world society as a whole in the end is always a matter of personal taste that should
not be forced upon other people. This is an integral part of a liberal democracy which is
accepted by any serious economist.
A quite diﬀerent matter, however, is that it is legitimate to examine whether the
economic process satisﬁes certain objectives, that – for the sake of the investigation –
are set by the analyst and persons who, according to their tastes, share these objectives.
Hence, a ﬁrm owner might want to know, whether he will, by following some business
strategy, has a chance of becoming a leader in his market. At the social level, people
might be interested to know whether a certain environmental policy can be expected to
maximize undiscounted aggregate welfare of all individuals living from now until the year
2525 (’if man is still alive’). Since people have preferences that, to some extent, show
altruism towards posterity and conservation of natural assets (otherwise climate change
would not have become a political issue at all) they, as voters in a democracy, ask experts
like Stern to carry out scientiﬁc studies in which intergenerational equity is a matter
of concern. Dealing with intergenerational distribution in a systematic (and not at all
unconditional) way, the Stern Report is far away from expressing solely ”the lofty vantage
point of the world social planner, perhaps striking the dying embers of the British empire”
(Nordhaus (2007), p. 691). Rather the Stern Report provides some further input to the
public discourse, and its proposals still need the support of a democratic majority to be
transformed into binding political decisions.18
In total, the fundamental condemnation of the Stern Review’s approach to intergener-
18A not quite harmless semantic problem, however, arises if (as in the Stern Report) the non-achievement
of some subjectively set normative standard is called ”market failure”. Most economists tend to reserve
the notion to coordination failures among economic subjects actually participating in market transactions
which is at odds with the maximization of aggregate welfare of diﬀerent generations, most of which have
not yet come into existence. The Stern Report should have been more cautious here.
15ational cost–beneﬁt–analysis is not only much exaggerated in tone but also not warranted
from the perspective of conventional economic methodology. Clearly the starting point of
Stern’s analysis is a subjective value judgement which, however, is not quite uncommon
for many economists and ordinary people (’sustainability’ if you like) which is made trans-
parent in the Report. Adhering to individualism, one should not accuse Stern and his
clients for taking their personal beliefs as the well–documented benchmark of the analysis.
The existence and legitimacy of a subjective ”Erkenntnisinteresse” is not to be denied just
from the liberal standpoint.
But the problem with the fundamental critics is not only that they partially miss
the point, but also that their approach has deﬁciencies of its own. First of all, there is
serious doubt that the market interest rate in fact is an adequate expression of the agents’
intertemporal preferences just when future generations are involved. There are market
imperfections as, e.g., a divergence between agents’ economic and political preferences
(Nyberg (2000)), unduly high personal risk premia, imperfect property rights (Sinn (2007))
or Sen’s famous ”assurance problem” (Sen (1967)), that may prevent intergenerational
altruism from materializing by isolated transactions in the market place.19
From the methodological viewpoint it is, however, much more serious that the fun-
damental critics give the false expression that climate change policy is possible without
ethical considerations at all and so – pretending that ”economics is an ethic–free zone”
(Broome (2005), p. 80) – throw the child out with the bath. As soon as actions of some
people (”the current generation”) aﬀect other defenseless people that cannot take part in
the decision process today (”the future generations”) either one adopts complete laissez–
faire (”Let them alone!”)20 or one has to look for some behavioral standards and norms.
Tackling problems of distribution between generations in a serious way involves that not
yet born people receive consideration in their own right. (See on this Padilla (2002).)
Here ethics unavoidably comes into play because its classical task is to device (in liberal
thinking clearly not to prescribe in an ultimate way) rules of acceptable behavior towards
others and – in the context of economics – to reﬂect about distributional values. Thus
”we cannot help being ethical from the start” (Broome (2005), p. 81). Ethical judge-
ments, however, are never free of some arbitrariness, which may cause some discomfort for
economists as scholars of an empirical science. Observing the market cannot take away
from us the, to some degree elusive, ethical reﬂection if we have some interest in the well–
being of posterity. Only with the help of some normative yardstick it becomes possible
at all to judge the well functioning of the market mechanism and, if necessary, to design
collective action to protect future generations.
The fundamental critics of the Stern Report do not seem to take this basic ethical issue
very serious, but directly jump into an, at a closer look not well–grounded, pragmatism.
So, e.g., the possible ethical content of the calibration procedure which determines the
parameters δ and η of the social welfare function, making them ﬁt to current interest
rates ini the framework of computational general equilibrium (CGE) models remains in
the dark (Nordhaus (2007), pp. 692–693). Moreover, the projection of interest rates over
a longer time horizon is, from these critics’ perspective, somewhat inconsistent, because
19This is to mean that benevolent behavior towards future generations only pays for an altruistic in-
dividual if she can be sure that a suﬃcient number of other individuals will act in the same way. For a
discussion see Hepburn (2006b).
20So Quiggin (2006), p. 14, criticizes Nordhaus for adhering to such a position by using, in earlier
studies, a pure discount rate of 3% since this is ”tantamount to saying that the future (certainly anyone
more than two generations away from us) can go to hell.”
16after 100 years or so yet unborn people will make the decisions on the capital market
that then determine the level of the interest rate. So one cannot claim that the analysis
is only based on actually revealed preferences. Another main point of concern is that
not very much reason is given for employing a relatively high value for the pure time
discount rate ρ. Nordhaus (2007, p. 696) only uses a thought experiment showing that a
discount rate ρ close to zero would produce a ”bizarre result”, which is nothing more than
another version of the old (and refutable) ’excessive savings’ argument. Ethical reasoning
on the size of ρ21 is thus substituted by ad hoc assumptions, that are based on some
mixture of plausibility considerations and reference to empirical facts. Overall, it is not
Stern but some of his fundamental critics who are in danger of confounding objective facts
with subjective values.22 Against this background, a major merit of the Stern Review at
the methodological level is that it brings the unavoidable ethical underpinning of climate
change policy to the fore. As it should be part of any economic analysis the underlying
value judgements are laid down in a transparent way so that everyone immediately knows
what is going on and that ethically sensible critics, as Dasgupta (2007) or Beckermann &
Hepburn (2007), can set in directly confronting these speciﬁc assumptions. Perhaps, the
Stern Review has also contributed to revitalize the general discussion on the relationship
between ethics and economics, going far beyond the issue of climate change policy.
At the end of his argument Nordhaus (2007) comes somewhat closet to Stern’s position,
when he shows, that by assuming ρ = 0.001 and η = 3 for ’run 3’ of his revised DICE
model, he is able to produce time paths for interest rates and implicit carbon prices which
are very similar to the ’run 1’ where ρ = 0.015 and η = 2 had been supposed. This
turn of argument is, at the same time, reassuring and irritating. On one hand, it is
reassuring because Nordhaus, to some extent, vindicates a basic message of the Stern
Report, i.e. that, in principle, one can do without pure time discounting and instead
choose η appropriately. The problem is then reduced to the choice of η which is also the
main point of Dasgupta’s criticism and of our paper. On the other hand, it is irritating,
because there is some contradiction to Nordhaus’ elsewhere stated belief, that a relatively
high value of ρ is indispensable. Overall understanding would have been facilitated if
Nordhaus had directly said that – in his opinion – Stern simply has chosen the wrong η,
i.e. η = 1 instead of η = 3. So again, we can conclude from these reﬂections that the
discussion on valuation over time should ﬁrst of all be on η, its adequate level and possible
methods to determine it. Otherwise, too much hot air might cause a tempest in the teapot
and an unnecessary confusion over the basic conceptual questions.
6 Conclusion
The Stern Review has not only stimulated the discussion on social discounting, but has
reinforced some shift of emphasis. Instead of focusing on the pure time preference rate
ρ as in the standard literature on evaluation over time, the Report (as other more re-
21To defend a value of ρ that – also under conditions of certainty – lies signiﬁcantly above zero (as
Beckermann & Hepburn (2007), pp. 198-202) some ”agent relative ethics” in the human sense can be
applied.
22In a comment on his critics, Stern (2007), p. 14, has, in a very clear way, denounced the so called
”revealed ethics approach”: ”But let us take on directly the question of whether it could ever be reasonable
to think that markets could reveal social values for use in discounting beneﬁts into the far future. Our
response is a clear ’no’. We cannot and should not avoid taking on directly the basic ethical discussion.
Market observations will not solve the problem for us.”
17cent contributions) mainly uses the inequality aversion parameter η (that characterizes
the transformation function underlying the intertemporal social welfare function) to bring
about a balance of interest between diﬀerent generations. In this way, an ethically ques-
tionable unequal treatment of generations is avoided and, additionally, the danger of a
non–sustainable development, i.e. decreasing consumption along an optimal path, is deﬁ-
nitely excluded, which, in this paper, has been shown in an elementary two period model.
This supports the view, that it seems preferable to look primarily at η (and not at ρ) when
intergenerational distribution is at stake. Having this (gradual) change of paradigm in the
economist’s perception of intertemporal evaluation, the next question naturally is to ﬁnd
the appropriate level for the parameter η. The Stern Report itself remains very short on
that, partly referring to a few empirical studies on the size of η. In total, however, em-
pirical end more recently experimental evidence is not uniform, since it presents a broad
range of η values, going from near zero to values larger than 3. It is, however, doubtful,
whether such observed data should serve as a sound basis for decisions, when normative
criteria for the ethically appropriate treatment of other persons, i.e. future generations,
can be found. We, therefore, introduced some simple normative axioms in order to deﬁne
the relevant range of η, as it is common in ethical social choice theory. The main result
of these considerations has been that setting η = 1, as used in the main part of the Stern
Report, is an extreme assumption. Rather, η = 1 is a lower bound for reasonable values
of inequality aversion when excessive savings in the face of productivity changes is to be
avoided. Adopting a status non–envy condition we may, as in this postulate, infer e.g. a
value of η = 2. Combining absolute non–envy with relative non–envy a range between 1
and 2 would be obtained, which, fortunately, does not diﬀer very much from the results
of the empirical studies.
Postulating the use of some η ≥ 1 is well in line with most of the critics of the Stern
Report. Some of the objections raised against the Report, however, go far over the top as
they completely deny the ethical intention underlying Stern’s approach to intertemporal
cost–beneﬁt–analysis. These critics fail to provide a convincing alternative and stick to a
pragmatic approach, i.e. calibration of parameters in the CGE–framework, which, from
the normative perspective is not adequately founded. To reconcile this pragmatism with
a sound ethical analysis may be an important future task not only in the ﬁeld of climate
change.
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